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On a Theory of Stock Price Behavior
Introduction
Under classical economic theory market behavior is analyzed in terms of
demand and supply schedules and the stability of their intersection at equilib-
rium. The procedure by which equilibrium is reached is customarily represented
A
by some form of Walrasian tatonnment process--a process that permits prices to
respond to excess demand through a recontracting device which only allows exchanges
to take place when equilibrium is reached.— One consequence of this theory is
that all changes in price are a result of shifts in either the demand or supply
schedules. Concurrently^ once such movements in price are stated as a time
series of actual prices these prices represent a sequence of equilibrium posi-
tions. To understand the behavior of a specific market it is necessary to be
able to account for such price changes. If one employs classic theory one is
led to search for the processes which govern the behavior of the demand and
supply schedules as well as the process or processes that represent the equili-
brating mechanism.
2/Behavioral theory,— on the other hand, provides a somewhat different
theoretical schema by which to interpret market phenomena. Decision-makers
— An excellent review article devoted in part to the properties of this
recontracting procedure is provided by: Taskashi Negishi, "The Stability of
Competitive Economy: A Survey Article/' Econometrica
,
Vol. 30, October 1962,
pp. 635-669.
2/
— This approach as related to a theory of firm behavior is presented in
some detail in: R.M. Cyert and J.G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963.

are represented by a set of decision processes that act on as well as react
to information which is already available in memory or is procurable from
the environment. All behavior, under this theoretical framework, is a
consequence of some describable decision process acting upon an ascertainable
body of information. In short, whether one is dealing with one or many
individuals acting by themselves or in groups, the resulting decision behavior
can be described by a set of decision processes acting upon the relevant
information. Since both individuals and firms frequently buy and sell
commodities through the medium of a market it is a reasonable extension
of this theory to hypothesize that market behavior is a direct consequence
of the interaction of a collection of such individual decision processes.
A market's behavior is usually described in terms of variations in the
price and quantity of items purchased and sold. At any one instant of time
3/
only one price is in effect for each item within a specific market.— Over
time these prices change, and it is this alteration in price that constitutes
one important aspect of a market's behavior. Accordingly, it is these price
fluctuations that must be accounted for if one is to be able to explain and
predict market behavior.
Little attention, however, has been paid to the problem of trying to
explain a market's behavior by accounting for the interactions which take
place among the actual decision processes of its participants. Although only
3/
— Clearly, a commodity's price can differ within, for instance, wholesale
and retail markets. But for a particular market at one period of time there
is only one of such prices in effect.
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in its initial stages^ the research reported in this paper is directed toward
this specific task. In brief, the object of this research is to demonstrate
that the behavior of prices in a particular market--namely, the Over-the-Counter
security market--can be explained by a knowledge of the decision behavior of
the individuals concerned.
General Considerations
One reason for the lack of empirical research on market processes may
well be that in many market situations price is a part of the information
required by the individual or firm in order to decide on the quantity to buy
or sell. As such, price is one item in a decision-maker's set of information
prior to making a decision. While prices may change over time, the price at
any one moment is that which is used by the decision-maker. In these instances
price itself is not subject to negotiation. The buyer (seller) can decide
to buy (sell) more or less of a particular commodity at the stated price.
But he is not provided with an opportunity to revise the price by a tatonnment
or other similar process while the decision is being made.
A consumer in a department store, supermarket, or any other retail estab-
lishment is an example of such activity. All items have a stated price and
the consumer's problem is to decide how much of each^ if any, to purchase.
To explain a consumer's behavior, all one needs to know are the prevailing
prices and his decision processes. It is not necessary to know anything about
the mechanism by which these particular prices are set. In some situations it
may be necessary to know something about the recent history of certain prices,
e.g., are they special sales prices? Even in this event, however, to explain
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the consumer's behavior it is quite unnecessary to know why the prices have
changed.—
On the seller's side of the market an example is provided by decision
processes which account for the setting of prices in a department store. Again,
at each moment of time there is only one price attached to each item in the
store. It is up to the price setter to decide whether to alter these prices
or not, but such alterations do not take place from instant to instant. They
are based on a set of decision rules which are activated by certain events--
notably, the recent history of sales, the level of inventories, the change in
seasons, the approach of holidays, etc. All this information constitutes
part of the initial conditions for the price setting decision process. Although,
prices do change over time, prevailing prices at any one period of time can be
explained solely by means of this process and not by a process which incorporates
the customer's immediate reaction to these prices.—
In brief, under such conditions a classical market, with its own mechanisms
for setting and adjusting prices, does not appear to exist. Prices are set by
one set of decision processes and purchase decisions are determined by another.
At no one point in time do these processes directly interact. That is to say,
the department store or supermarket is perhaps a convenient place for consumers
to examine the available goods and for merchants to display their wares. But
4/
— A theory of consumer behavior detailing this approach is described in:
G.P.E. Clarkson, The Theory of Consumer Demand ; A Critical Appraisal , Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963.
— For a detailed model of the price setting decision process in a depart-
ment store, which has survived empirical tests, see: R.M. Cyert and J.G. March,
op. cit
.
,
Chapter 7.
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within these shops all purchases and sales are conducted at set prices and
there is no opportunity for the classic balancing of prices and quantity to
be carried out from one moment to the next. To understand the behavior of
the buyer or seller^ therefore^ it is sufficient to know their respective
decision processes. Consequently, to account for this class of market behav-
ior it is not necessary to develop a further set or body of theory. Manifestly,
it is sufficient to be able to explain the behavior of the individual partic-
ipants
.
There are other types of markets, however, in which buyer and seller come
together and by their interaction directly establish price and quantity. One
such case is provided by the various security markets. In this instance the
commodity in question, whether it be a bond, a stock, or a future, is known to
both buyer and seller, and it is through their interaction that purchase and
sales agreements are made. Since it is the fluctuation in prices that is one
of the chief characteristics of these markets, it is here if anywhere that a
classical theory of market behavior might be required. Indeed, if it is a
function of a theory of market behavior to explain movement in prices, then
the price fluctuations of security markets are prime candidates for explanation
by such a theory.
It is my position that in order to explain the behavior of security prices
a theory of market behavior, as such, is not required. For even in this
situation price behavior is a direct consequence of the decision processes of
the individuals concerned, and no additional mechanism or theory is required
to account for this behavior. Although classical theory employs a supply-equal-
to-demand relation to establish an equilibrium market price, it is my contention
o^
that the inclusion of such a mechanism is completely unnecessary. In brief,
I am suggesting that the behavior of prices can be explained without explicit
reference to a separate equilibrating process. And further, that market
behavior is strictly determined by the decision processes of the individual
participants.
While this is hardly a novel conclusion, in that it is a somewhat obvious
statement of the case, it implies for any specific market that one needs to
know in detail the decision processes of all participants. If the behavior
of certain commodity prices is being examined the number of such participants
could be very large indeed. Indeed, if one has to be able to describe each
of these decision processes an explanation of price behavior will be a formid-
able and wearisome task. Security markets, however, like other types of
markets, are not composed of a collection of individuals indiscriminately
competing for the opportunity to buy and sell. On the contrary, the process
by which orders to buy and sell are executed is governed by certain institutional
constraints, and the participants in the market can be classified into different
categories. For example, in a security market actual transactions are usually
conducted through official agents, such as brokers and traders, and the partic-
ipants can be categorized as to whether they represent investment societies^
6/
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, or private individuals,— Now, if
the traders in a particular market behave according to a specific set of decision
rules, then, and this is clearly a testable proposition, it is possible to
— While this is hardly an exhaustive set of categories, the participants
in any market can be classified into observable sets of different types of
investors
.

describe the decision processes which determine their decision behavior. Simi-
larly, if each category of investors behaves in recognizably different ways,
such discrepancies must be a result of differences in their decision processes.
Accordingly, if within each category decision behavior is sufficiently similar,
then a set of decision rules can be described which will represent the decision-
making procedures of each class of investors. Under these assumptions, all of
which can be analyzed for their empirical validity, the problem of explaining
price behavior becomes relatively simple and straightforward. For the prevail-
ing price at any one moment will be a direct consequence of the interaction of
the relevant classes of decision processes.
Price Behavior in a Security Market
The market selected for this study is the Over-the-Counter security market
which accounts, it should be noted, for approximately three-fourths of the
gross value of all security sales in the United States. According to the
previous discussion a theory can be constructed to account for this market's
behavior solely by determining the decision processes of the relevant classes
of participants. Clearly, it has yet to be demonstrated that each class of
investors, traders and brokers can be adequately represented by one type of
decision process. But for expository ease permit the assumption to be made
that such a classificatory scheme is practicable.
The theory then consists of a set of such decision processes where market
behavior--f luctuations in the prices of particular securities--is generated by
specific sequences of interactions among these processes. In particular, it
is hypothesized that there are three main classes of decision processes--to wit,
those of investors, brokers and traders. This is not to say, for example, that
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all investors have identically the same portfolio selection process. Rather,
it is being postulated that there is a describable class of decision procedures
which represent investor decision behavior and that differences among investors
can be accounted for by alterations in certain parameters within this class of
decision mechanisms.
In order to illustrate this general schema as well as to describe in some
detail the particular decision processes as they have been developed so far
consider in turn the decision behavior of the three classes of market partic-
ipants
.
A. The Trader
In the Over-the-Counter market a trader deals only with stock brokers or
other traders. Under no circumstances is it possible for a private individual
or institution to deal directly with a trader. The stock broker takes orders
from private or institutional investors and then telephones a trader to
ascertain price. Since brokers charge a fee for this service, the cost per
share to the ultimate purchaser differs somewhat from the price set by the
trader. Each trader maintains an interest in between fifteen and twenty
stocks, and in response to an inquiry will quote either a selling (asked) or
a buying (bid) price on any one of these securities.—
A trader is undoubtedly influenced by many different items of information.
For instance, a single trader has access to a number of sources of information,
e.g., the Dow Jones ticker, the Dow Jones broad tape, the daily publication
— The difference between asked and bid prices is what is known as the
spread.
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of the National Quotation Bureau which gives for each security the traders
concerned and the respective prices at the middle of the preceding day^ and
telephone conversations with other trades and stock brokers. Nonetheless, all
trading activity is carried on over a telephone in very brief intervals of time.
Accordingly, at any one moment a trader can be asked over the telephone for
the price on a particular security. He responds, as a rule, with the bid
and asked prices on a hundred-share lot. If this price is accepted, a trans-
action has been made and the trader has either sold or bought a number of such
lots.
It follows from this outline of the procedure that when a trader receives
a telephone call he knows that the broker has an order to buy or sell. Thus,
whether there will be an immediate transaction or not depends entirely upon
the broker's reaction to the trader's quoted price. Since the broker can tele-
phone any of the traders who are known to have an interest in this particular
security, he is not dependent upon a single quote from one trader. However, as
soon as the broker accepts a price that is the price at which the transaction
is made. In short, it is the market price in the particular security at that
instant of time.
Before examining a trader's pricing decision process in detail it is
pertinent to consider his possible alternative strategies. One alternative
is for the trader to deliberately maintain either a net long or net short posi-
tion in a particular security. In a rising market the value of his. inventory
will increase, and as a result he would want to have a net long position. Con-
versely, in a falling market a profit can be made by buying back stock at a
lower value than that which he sold it for. Accordingly, he would want to
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maintain a net short position. During certain periods of time traders may
8/
actively seek to maintain long or short positions.—' Currently, the strategy
is to make a profit by trading on the difference between the bid and asked
prices. Although traders may make a certain amount of profit by taking advan-
tage of a position they find themselves in, the principal monetary return comes
from buying at the bid and selling at the asked price. As a result, to be
successful the trader must maintain this spread between prices such that when
combined with the volume of trading an adequate level of compensation is assured,
A.l The Pricing Decision
Given this brief description of the trader's function in the Over-the-
Counter market, it is now relevant to examine the pricing or quoting decision
process itself. A decision is required of a trader each time a broker telephones
to ask for a price. Since a trader must reply virtually immediately, one would
not expect the pricing process to be unduly complex. According to a recent study
the basic components of the pricing process can be represented as follows:
9/
Interest of
Inquirer
Estimate of
Street Prices
Desired Direction
of Position Change
Desired Price in
Relation to Street
Figure 1
8 /
— The most notable period when these strategies were actively pursued was
in the latter part of the 1920's, see: I. Friend, et. al , The Over-the-Counter
Securities Markets, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958.
9/
— R.A. Jenkins, "Professional Trader Price Quoting in the Over-the-Counter
Stock Market," unpublished Master's Thesis, Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964.
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while each of these components is influenced by a number of other factors,—' the
decision process which takes place at the end of a telephone can be represented by
the interaction of these four items. For example, a trader alters his quote
depending upon the characteristics of the inquirer. Such factors as whether the
inquirer is a buyer or seller, whether the orders from this person are usually
large or small and whether he is a friendly— competitor or not affect the quote
in a manner to be outlined below.
Concurrently, a trader knows whether he wants to increase or decrease his
current long or short position in a particular stock. For at all times the trader
is aware of his current position as well as his estimate of the position he
would like to have. Since traders normally have a maximum amount of money that
they can invest in any one security, their general impressions and attitudes
toward the market, constrained by this limit, are what identify the position he
would currently like to be in. Any discrepancy between the desired and actual
position provides what has been labelled the "desired direction of position change,"
The estimate of the street or current market price is derived by the simple
process of listening to the broker's reply on the telephone. If a trader's quote
is accepted then he is either right on or a little low (on asked price), right
on or a little above (on bid price) the current market. Conversely, if no trans-
action is effected, his asked price is a bit high and his bid price is a bit low.
If, for some reason, the stock has not been traded for awhile, an individual
10/
— For a full description of the decision process see ibid
.
, Chapter 3.
— A friendly competitor is one who does not take advantage of a bargain
or poor quote.
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trader can obtain an estimate of the current price by telephoning a competitor,
But if the stock is being actively traded, each trader will have a fairly
accurate estimate of the current market price. Given this estimate and any
desired change in position, the quoted price can be directly determined.
While the actual increments, e.g., 1/8, 1/4, 1/8, etc., may vary with
12/different securities— the price setting decision process can be represented
by the following table:
Inquirer and
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Table 1 describes the components of the price quoting decision process in
sufficient detail to permit some of the processes to be subjected to test.
Further, from the evidence presented in the study, these decision processes
are sufficient to account for a substantial proportion of the observed changes
13/in traders' prices for a number of securities.— Consequently, it can be
accepted, for the moment, as a detailed representation of the price setting
decision process.
Of particular interest in this decision procedure is the mechanism by which
a price is changed. If a trader quotes a price which does not result in a trans-
action, no change is made in the price. But, if a transaction is ef fected--i. e.
,
the broker accepts the trader's price--then the trader's price will change in the
direction specified by the process outlined above. As a result, price changes
are, for the most part, a consequence of a transaction being consummated and
are seldom altered to secure a transaction. Thus, prices respond to the occur-
rence of transactions--and are in effect determined by these contracts.
Lest the reader feel that somehow the price setting process could not be
as simple as portrayed above, or that it would be more likely for the trader
to change his price in order to get transactions, it is worth noting that the
process outlined above apparently reflects a decision procedure which is used
by many people when placed in roughly the same situation. That is to say, when
faced with the task of bidding for contracts in an experimental market situation
most subjects employ decision procedures which are strikingly similar to those
used by the Over-the-Counter trader. This observation is one result of a series
13/
— See ibid
.
,
Chapters 4 and 5,
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14/
of experimental investigations of individual and group decision processes.
—
The experiment itself consists of placing a subject in a situation where he has
to announce bids in two markets simultaneously. The subject states his bids in
monetary terms, and the experimenter by consulting a specific list of random
numbers determines whether these bids "win" or "lose," A bid "wins" when it is
below the experimenter's number, and "loses" when it is equal or above it. In
some cases there is a fixed cost associated with each trial, but in all varia-
tions examined so far the subject is restricted to making at most one new bid
on each trial. Hence, on each trial the subject has to decide which market to
leave alone and which bid to alter, if at all. A subject's earnings are a direct
function of the contracts he wins over a given number of trials.
In this experiment a subject's behavior is a record of prices on two mar-
kets. These prices change over time. Hence, an explanation of this behavior
consists of an explanation of the changes in the respective prices. Since sub-
jects have no direct knowledge about the list of numbers employed by the experi-
menter, their behavior is clearly a function of how they decide to respond to
their record of wins and losses as it unfolds. While many of the subjects who
participate in this experiment employ slightly different decision procedures,
there is one set of processes that characterizes and accounts for a large propor-
tion of the observed behavior. This process is expressed by the following table:
14/
— See: W.F. Pounds, "A Study of Problem Solving Control," unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1964; G.P.E. Clarkson and
F.D. Tuggle, "A Theory of Group Decision Behavior," Working Paper No. 92-64,
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964.

15
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reflected in the bidding process of the subjects^ the en^irical validity of the
trader's price setting process has received a certain measure of independent
empirical support.
B. The Broker
In the Over-the-Counter market the broker's function is to accept orders
from customers and by talking directly with traders negotiate the transactions.
Clearly, a broker does not have to accept the first price he receives over the
telephone. But if he frequently deals with a particular set of traders he in
turn will have an estimate of the relation between their prices and the prices
of other traders, i.e. the street. What the broker does not know is the trader's
desired direction of position change^ and hence whether his price is deliberately
slightly above or below the street price. A broker's task is to find a favorable
price for his customer, and if he believes he can do better by trying another
trader all he has to do is pick up the telephone and find out.
One of the factors which influences the trader's price, not noted above,
is the activity or volume of purchases or sales in a particular security. Each
trader has a ceiling on the amount of money he can commit to a single stock which,
given the prevailing price, places a limit on the number of shares of this stock
that he can hold. Now, if traders in Stock A are known to be holding approximately
500 shares each, and a broker receives an order to buy (sell) 4,000 shares, he is
clearly placed in a bit of a dilemma. Since no one trader can fill his order,
he must buy (or sell) from a number of traders. News of this activity in Stock
A will spread to competing traders fairly rapidly. Consequently, the broker can
expect the price to rise (fall) as he proceeds from one trader to the next. Thus,
a broker faced with a large order for a particular security is unlikely to be
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able to negotiate the entire transaction at a single price.
—
The theory^ then, makes a number of simplifying assumptions about a broker's
decision behavior. First, it does not allow (so far at any rate) a broker to
carry an inventory of securities in his own account. Second, no provision is
made for the possibility of a broker advising an investor on what securities to
buy or sell. In short, a broker is represented as an agent whose task is to trans-
act a client's orders at a favorable price, where the term "favorable price" is
defined in terms of the broker's estimate of the street price. However, the
decision process which accounts for this segment of a broker's decision behavior
has not yet been examined in detail. Thus, while the current model contains a
brokerage mechanism that permits transactions to take place it cannot be reported
upon as one which has been subjected to empirical test.
C. The Investors
The investor, whether he represents himself or an institution, constitutes
the origin of the orders which a broker receives. While each investor may feel
that he analyzes the market and its securities by an unique method, there appears
to be a number of similarities among these methods of approach. In fact, it is
posited that investors can probably be placed in a modest number of categories
where these categories are defined in terms of the methods of analysis and selec-
tion employed. To identify these categories it is necessary to examine the port-
folio selection processes of a number of types of investors.
For example, the portfolio selection process of investors of trust funds
for banks has already, in part, been examined. This process consists of a
— The possibility of a broker carrying an inventory of securities is
currently ignored.
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particular set of decision processes which are described in terms of specific
discrimination nets. These nets contain a collection of individual tests that
in turn refer to those attributes of securities which are considered important
16/
for trust investment purposes. While the theory of trust investment— cannot as
yet claim to represent the portfolio selection process of all trust investors, it
would not be a difficult task to conduct the requisite tests.— If such tests
corroborate the theory, then this particular set of decision processes would
represent in detail the procedures by which investors of trust funds select secu-
rities for their portfolios. Once these procedures are known the only other items
of information required are the amount of funds available for investment classified
by the types of portfolios desired, e.g. growth, income, income and growth, etc.
By an application of the decision process to current market data specific port-
folios of securities are generated. These portfolios represent the orders which
are given to the broker by the investor. Hence, it is the portfolio decisions
which constitute the origin of a broker's orders.
It is worth noting that portfolio decisions are relatively insensitive to
the exact prices prevailing in the market at the time the portfolios are selected.
The actual price for a particular order is only determined after the broker has
received it and has contracted with a trader. Hence, the investor must select
his portfolios on the basis of some previous prices. These prices may closely
approximate the actual prices paid after the broker has completed his transaction.
— G.P.E. Clarkson, Portfolio Selection : A Simulation of Trust Investment
,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1962.
— Indeed, part of this testing process has been carried out with quite favor-
able results on the trust investment process of banks in Massachusetts. See:
W. Mihaltse, "A Model of an Institutional Investor," unpublished Master's thesis,
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965.
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Nevertheless^ portfolio decisions are clearly made without an exact knowledge
of the price per security that will be paid.
Di^e to various legal constraints investors of trust funds are not allowed
to purchase securities on the Over-the-Counter market. Hence, with respect to
this market a knowledge of the trust investment process does not provide the
basis for one category of investors. However, since it is possible to describe
the portfolio procedures of trust investors there is no reason to suppose that
the investment behavior of other institutional investors who do participate in
the Over-the-counter market cannot be described in a similar manner. Consequently,
since a theory of each class of investors can be constructed and tested, it is
clearly possible to describe the processes by which brokers' orders are generated.
Testing the Market Processes
In the current model market behavior is generated by the interactions among
brokers and traders. Given the traders' decision process as described above,
and given a simple decision process to account for broker behavior, the behavior
of prices is determined by these two processes. That is to say, if one is not
concerned with explaining the flow of buy and sell orders to the broker, all that
is required is the sequence of orders to the brokers plus the two decision pro-
cedures. If orders are considered as part of the model's initial conditions,
the behavior of the relevant prices are a result of the interaction of the
broker's transaction process and the trader's price setting process.
In order to subject the theory to empirical test two types of market situa-
tions are being considered. The first is the simple case where there is only
one trader who holds an inventory in a particular stock. Since this condition
is likely to occur only when there is little interest and activity in a security.
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the number of brokers who receive orders for this stock will also be quite
limited. Hence, the behavior of the price of this security will be a direct con-
sequence of a few brokers interacting with one trader. Given such a situation,
it is neither difficult nor laborious to specify the relevant parameters of the
decision processes employed by each of the participants. Once these processes
are described, with the brokers' orders forming a part of the initial conditions,
the price behavior of this particular security can be immediately explained.
For the interaction of these decision processes will generate a sequence of price
movements which should be identical to the observed.
To test the accuracy with which this model reproduces the observed price
movements in the selected security, it is only necessary to set up a criterion
of success and failure and compare the two time series. Such a comparison can
be conducted upon the actual prices themselves, as well as on whether the model
produces a set of prices that move at each decision point in the same direction
as the observed. Once measures of success and failure are def ined--i.e. the
conditions under which the model's movements in price are to be considered the
same as the actual--the model's level of success can be measured by the frequency
with which it accounts for the observed changes. Thus, since each of the indi-
vidual decision processes can be independently subjected to test, the model as
a whole can be satisfactorily tested on its ability to reproduce the observed
time series.
The second case considers a situation where there is more than one trader
who holds an inventory in a particular security. Under this condition the model
becomes correspondingly more complex. For once there are several traders as well
as a number of brokers there may be more than once price prevailing at any one
point in time. Each broker agrees to a transaction when he thinks he has secured
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a favorable price. But each broker does not canvass all traders before making a
decision. In addition, more than one broker may be interested in a certain secu-
rity at one period of time. Therefore, it is possible for there to be slightly
different prices prevailing over any given interval of time.
In order to reproduce these detailed events the model has to include the
individual decision processes of each participant. To empirically determine these
separate processes is a time consuming task. But if a complete explanation of a
particular stream of price behavior is desired the separate decision processes
must be taken into account.
However, if an explanation of each movement in price is not required and if
the behavior under investigation is concerned only with some of the more aggregate
characteristics of price behavior over an interval of time, e.g., direction of
change from beginning to end of interval, incremental change, etc., then a sim-
plified model would suffice. Such a model would consist of a generalized broker's
decision process interacting with a generalized price quoting process. Whether
such a model would produce the desired behavior is open to empirical investigation.
But since each of the individual processes can be independently subjected to
empirical test, the empirical validity of the entire model is not solely dependent
upon the general characteristics of the generated time series being similar to
the observed. Consequently, it would appear that it is quite possible to develop
a general model of price behavior without too much difficulty.
The point to note is that none of these models require a special equilibrat-
ing mechanism. Each is based solely upon the interaction of independent decision
processes. Thus, although their empirical validity has yet to be demonstrated,
the research described above is in my opinion sufficient to indicate theoretical
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and empirical merit of this approach. Accordingly, while only one type of market
has been examined in any detail, it would appear that all market behavior could
be explained by theories which include the decision processes of the individual
participants and which do not incorporate the classic equilibrating hypothesis as
a distinct and separate market process.



